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Pelofsky and Pelofsky: Pelofsky: Employee's Rights

EMPLOYEE'S RIGHTS UNDER THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT
JOEL PELOFSKY*
LAWRENCE H. PELOFSKY**

Benjamin Owens, Jr. worked for Swift & Company in Kansas City,

Missouri, trimming loins and handling heavy halves and quarters of beef.
In May of 1959 he felt badly and took sick leave to rest up. Owens had
a congenital heart murmer, was troubled with high blood pressure, and
by May had become overweight. He placed himself under a doctor's
care, lost fifty pounds, and was given the doctor's approval to return to
work in August. The company doctor refused to permit Owens to return
because of the high blood pressure and cardiac condition. In January
of 1960 Owens was examined by a third doctor who also approved his
return to work. He was permitted to return by the company nurse but
after three days was fired by the superintendent on the ground that he
was not able to work.
After his discharge Owens went to his union, the National Brotherhood of Packinghouse Workers, and requested that it present a grievance
based on his discharge. The collective bargaining agreement between
Swift & Company and the union contained a five-step grievance procedure.
Owens' grievance was processed through the first four steps to no avail.
The fifth step was arbitration. At the conclusion of the fourth phase,
the union and Swift agreed to hold the grievance open without proceeding to the fifth step. The union then suggested that Owens obtain another
medical opinion. He did so and the doctor stated that he was not able
to work because of the high blood pressure and some heart damage. At
this point the union decided not to carry the grievance to arbitration
because of the absence of compelling medical evidence to support its
position.1
*Lecturer in Law, University of Missouri; Attorney at Law, Kansas City,
Missouri; A.B. 1959, LL.B. 1962, Harvard University.
**Law Clerk to United States District Judge, Western District of Missouri;
A.B. 1963, J.D. 1965, University of Missouri.
The authors acknowledge the assistance given by Landon H. Rowland, an
associate with Watson, Ess, Marshall & Enggas, Kansas City, Missouri, whose
comments were of great value.
1. Sipes v. Vaca, 397 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. En Banc 1965), rev'd, 87 Sup. Ct.
903 (1967).
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The purpose of this article is to examine this fact situation in light
of the existing state of labor law and to attempt to ascertain what courses
of action and what remedies are available to the individual employee so
or similarly situated.
I. THE

COLLECTiVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT AND ITS ENFORCEMENT

Traditionally, the rights of the employee were created by an oral

contract of hire,2 but the imbalance of bargaining power caused these
rights to be few and their use restricted. The concept of the union was
developed to redress this imbalance. After the advent of unions, the oral

contract of hire was regarded as only the initiation of a relationship
whose terms and limits were set out in the collective bargaining agreement. This agreement, negotiated by the union as majority representative
of the employees in the bargaining unit and the employer, generally embodies provisions dealing with wages, rates of pay, hours, fringe benefits,

union security, grievance procedures and arbitration, management rights,
strikes and lockouts, seniority and discharge, vacations, health and safety,
and various other "conditions of employment." Some agreements are
more detailed than others, but each is designed to be a basic instrument
establishing a system of industrial self-government with the intention of
being a code governing rights and obligations for the present and the
future.'
The nature of the industrial community governed by the collective
bargaining agreement is such that the draftsmen of the agreement cannot
anticipate all the factual disputes which might arise. This inability
to predict all possible problems, together with the nature of the agreement as a basic document of government, causes the agreement to
be drafted in general terms. In addition, the failure of the parties to
reach settlements on specific issues will cause the inclusion, in the language
of the agreement, of deliberate ambiguities. These factors give rise to
continual rule making by the parties as a product of the grievance arbitration procedure. Thus, through the grievance procedure, the process
of collective bargaining continues during the life of the agreement.
By virtue of section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act,4
2. In Missouri, an oral contract of hire generally confers no rights upon the
employee and his employment is terminable at will. Christy v. Petrus, 295 S.W.2d
122 (Mo. En Banc 1956); Maddock v. Lewis, 386 S.W.2d 406 (Mo. 1965).
3. Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HAxv. L.
REV.

999 (1955).

4. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (5), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C.

158(a)(5) (1964).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol32/iss2/4
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the employer is under a duty to bargain with the employees' representatives
as they are defined in section 9(a) 5 of the act. These representatives are
accorded a status of exclusiveness; they pre-empt the rights of the
7
6
employees to bargain individually with their employer. By definition,
the union also exists for the purpose of dealing with the employer concerning grievances. Yet, although the collective agreement by its terms
does not pertain to any particular employee, it is obvious that each employee is affected by the terms of the agreement and has, under some
sort of contract analysis, the potential right to enforce them. The description of the employee's rights are deliberately obtuse because the
nature of the collective agreement, in the sense of placing it within a
legal category, is not clear.
In some ways the agreement is plainly a contract between the company and the union, with the employee standing in a relationship of
agency or third party beneficiary. Yet, unlike the ordinary contract, it is
not particularly a voluntary arrangement. 8 The duty to bargain is mandatory and, while there is no statutory duty to reach an agreement, the
pressures of the system are designed to produce agreement. Further,
the agreement is often binding even though one of the parties has ceased
to exist 9 or the expiration date has passed.' 0
The collective agreement is best described as a code of government
containing elements of contract. It contemplates a continuing relationship between management and labor, based upon an initial general
agreement and buttressed by a developed body of rules called the "common law of the shop." In this context, the individual's grievance cannot
be viewed in isolation from the other interests in the management-labor
relationship. Each of these interests must be protected from pressures
exerted by the others. Thus, the problem is not merely one of shielding
the individual employee from abuse by the collective force, i.e., the
union. It is also one of protecting the interests of the union as an organization, the interests of the individual employees who may be in compe5. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159 (1964).
6. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944).
7. National Labor Relations Act § 2(5), 49 Stat. 450 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(5) (1964).
8. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
See also Ratner, The Emergent Role of District Courts in National Labor Policy,
38 F.R.D. 81 (1965).
9. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
10. NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753 (1957), enforcing 116
N.L.R.B. 140 (1966).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1967
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tition with the grievant, the interests of the employees as a group, and
the future interests which may be affected through application of the
principle of stare decisis. Complete satisfaction of these interests will be
the exception and compromise the rule." The party most likely to bring
about this compromise is the union.
Yet, even though the mechanics of negotiating the collective bargaining agreement cause the employer to look to the union as the party
with which to deal, Congress has always described the rights of labor in
terms of the rights of the individual employee, as distinguished from the
rights of any collective group. The statutes clearly contemplate a sharing
of the powers. This concept of shared powers is perhaps most noticeable
in section 9(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act,' 2 which provides
in part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual
employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such
grievance adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining
representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with
the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then
in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative
has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
The proviso to section 9(a) suggests that there is an exception to
the union's status as exclusive representative and to the employer's
duty to bargain only with the union.' 3 The better view seems to be
that it confers a privilege rather than a right and thus may be bargained away. 14 The mere existence of the proviso to section 9(a), however, forces consideration of the competing interests of the individual
employee and the union and an attempt to strike a balance between
them. This attempt has been channeled into three approaches to the

problem.
11. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1952); Cox, Rights Under a

Labor Agreement, 69 HAtv. L. REV. 601 (1956).
12. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1964).
13. Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (1945); Summers, Individual
Righzts in Collective Agreements and Arbitration,37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 362 (1962).
14. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 n.7 (1965).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol32/iss2/4
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The first approach, relying on the proviso to 9(a) and on the decision
of the Supreme Court in Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. v. Burley,15 suggests
that the individual has an affirmative right to proceed and to control
the settlement of his grievance. 16 Enforcement of collective rights, on the
other hand, would be left to the union. Apparently this enforcement of
collective rights would include not only claims arising out of those promises which run directly to the union, such as recognition or check-off of
union dues, but also claims arising out of promises which run directly
to the individual but breach of which cannot be shown to affect an
identifiable person, as for example, the institution and maintenance of a
pension plan.
A second approach seeks to balance the claim of the union as the
exclusive bargaining representative against the claim of the individual
to the protection of his rights by giving the individual control of the
settlement of any claim involving certain recognized "critical job interests."'1 These critical job interests, which are reasoned to be basic to
the individual employment relationship, include claims for discharge, for
compensation for work already performed, and for seniority.' 8 Judicial relief
would be forthcoming only on a finding that the individual's claim has
merit. The remedies available to the employee would be arbitration or
damages. Damages, however, would be awarded only where it would
be "manifestly unfair to compel the employee to remain in the job situation or lose the value of his job rights."' 9 The employee must be
able to establish extreme misconduct upon the part of the union or of
the employer or both.
The third approach 20 has as its theme the idea that the intent of
the parties to the collective agreement should govern. Rather than attempt to formulate and adopt a priori rules, as is suggested by the first
two approaches, it is urged that the governing principles be drawn from
the "institutions of labor relations and shaped to their needs." 2' 1 Recognizing the several and diverse interests that may be affected by the settle15. 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
16. Report of Committee on Improvement of Administrati n of Union-Management Agreements, 1954, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143 (1955).
17. Blumrosen, Legal Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Au.'thority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13 RuTGERs L. REV. 631 (1959).
18. Id at 651-53. These are mere guidelines which the author has derived
from earlier decisions and which, he asserts, are applicable to future cases. Quaere,
if this rule does not ignore the implications of Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448 (1957).
19. Id. at 663.
20. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HAxv. L. REv. 601 (1956).
21. Id. at 605.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1967
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ment of a dispute either by way of the grievance arbitration procedure or
by way of litigation, the suggested approach is compromise. Initially, the
employer and the union are free to determine who will have the right
to enforce and to settle claims arising out of a breach of the collective
agreement. Absent such a determination the union will have the sole
right to enforce and to settle claims arising out of a breach of the collective agreement where the agreement contains a grievance arbitration
procedure controlled by the union. Protection is afforded the individual
employee in the form of a suit against the union to require it to enforce
the collective agreement. Where the collective agreement contains no
grievance arbitration procedure the agreement will be deemed to be incorporated into each individual contract of hire and enforceable by the individual, except that the union will enforce rights inuring to it as an organization.
This general bias in favor of a union-dominated pattern of enforcement of the collective agreement is emphasized by the exalted position
given the grievance arbitration procedure, clearly union-controlled, by
the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers trilogy. In those cases, the Court
held that every deference must be paid to the agreed upon procedure for
the settlement of disputes. The bias is further emphasized by a first glance
at section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act 22 which provides
in part:
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any
such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in
an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter and
any employer whose activities affect commerce as defined in this
chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor
organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the
employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States.
Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district
court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the
organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not
be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
22. Labor-Management Relations Act § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1961).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol32/iss2/4
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On its face the statute seems to give the union, as opposed to the individual employee, a neat procedural device through which it could enforce
the provisions of the collective agreement. That this portion of the statute
has been developed into something more than a procedural tool is a reflection of the indefinite nature of the collective agreement and the recognition that it represents a system of government more than an allinclusive code.
II. THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION

The obligation to fairly represent all of the members of the bargaining unit is implicit in the designation of the union as the exclusive
bargaining representative. 23 Thus, the duty can be said to be statutory
in its origin. Yet, at the same time, it could be considered contractual in
a sense of agency with accompanying fiduciary overtones. This relationship can be said to grow out of the authorization card given the union
by the employee. 24 On the other hand, it could be a duty which arises
out of a course of dealing which suggests contract or even contract implied in
fact or, to combine both statutory and contractual aspects, one which
arises out of the contract which impliedly incorporates the statute. The
true identity of the duty as statutory or contractual, if such a determination can be made, is important as the cases discussed later will indicate.
The first case which dealt with the duty of fair representation characterized it as statutory. This was Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. 2 5
arising under the Railway Labor Act and involving racial discrimination.
The union excluded Negroes from membership and attempted to contract
with the employer to deny them jobs. The Supreme Court formulated
the question "whether the Railway Labor Act . . . imposes on a labor
organization, acting by authority of the statute as the exclusive bargaining representative of a craft or class of railway employees, the duty
to represent all employees in the craft without discrimination" 26 It
answered that question by holding that the act imposed on the bargaining
representative the duty to exercise its powers on behalf of all the em23. Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation Under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo.
L. REv. 373 (1965); Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV.
151 (1957).
24. A typical authorization card gives the union authority to represent the
employee and on his behalf "to negotiate and conclude all agreements as to hours
of labor, wages and other employment conditions."
25. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
26. Id. at 193-94.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1967
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ployees of the class fairly. It further held that the courts could give relief
where the union breached this duty.
Almost unnoticed in the glare of Steele was another decision rendered the same day,2 7 which declared that this same duty was implicit
in the National Labor Relations Act. In that case the Supreme Court held:
The duties of a bargaining representative selected under the
terms of the Act extend beyond the mere representation of the
interests of its own group members. By its selection as bargaining representative it has become the agent of all the employees,
charged with the responsibility of representing their interests
28
fairly and impartially.
Most of the cases based upon breach of a duty of fair representation have arisen because of discrimination based on race. However, the
most significant recent cases have involved questions of seniority. One
of these decisions, NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co.,29 has resulted in the
creation of an unfair labor practice denominated a breach of the duty of
fair representation.
In that case, an employee left work April 12 on an authorized leave
of absence. He was due to return October 12 but became ill and did not
return until October 30. The company had a policy of permitting summer
leaves without loss of seniority if the leave was taken between April
15 and October 15. When the union learned of this employee's deviations
from the time schedules, it demanded his reduction in seniority. The
company consented. The Board first found a per se violation of the act
because the union had been given exclusive control over seniority status.
The Second Circuit disagreed but enforced on the theory that the power
granted the union "improperly encouraged union membership and discriminated against the employee." The union applied for certiorari. In
the interval, the Supreme Court, in Local 357, It'l. Bid. of Teamsters v.
NLRB,8 0 had rejected the per se approach. The Board asked that the
proceedings be vacated and the case remanded for further consideration.
27. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
28. Id. at 255.
29. This case had a tortuous history. Originally decided in Miranda Fuel Co.,
125 N.L.R.B. 454 (1959) and enforced in NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 284 F.2d
861 (2d Cir. 1960), certiorari was sought and granted and the case remanded for
reconsideration by the Board in Local 553, Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 366
U.S. 763 (1961). The Board reconsidered in Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181
(1962), and the Second Circuit denied enforcement in NLRB v. Miranda Fuel
Co., 326 F.2d 172 (1963).
30. 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol32/iss2/4
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On remand the Board made new findings based on the evidence
obtained in the earlier hearing. This time the Board found violations
of sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) on the union's part and of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) on the company's part. The evidence, said
the Board, indicated that the only motive for the reduction was to encourage, illegally, union membership. The Board also stated, after citing

Steele and Wallace:
Viewing these mentioned obligations of a statutory representative in the context of the 'right' guaranteed employees by
Section 7 of the Act 'to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing,' we are of the opinion that Section 7 thus
gives employees the right to be free from unfair or irrelevant or
invidious treatment by their exclusive bargaining agent in matters affecting their employment. This right of employees is a
statutory limitation on statutory bargaining representatives, and
we conclude that Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act accordingly prohibits labor organizations, when acting in a statutory representative
capacity, from taking action against any employee upon considerations or classifications which are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair.3 '
The Second Circuit denied enforcement, generally on the ground
that the Board's findings were not supported by substantial evidence.
The three judges wrote three opinions. Two united to deny enforcement
on evidentiary grounds. Both of these judges, Medina and Lombard,
looked at the section 7 argument but only Medina took a position. He
rejected its validity on the ground that discrimination, unrelated to union
considerations, was not a per se violation of the act. Lombard declared
it was unnecessary to reach the question. Friendly, dissenting, disagreed
both with the majority's view of the evidence and with their interpretation of the impact of the decision in Local 357 on this case. He thought
that there was clearly a section 8(b) (2) violation and that the majority,
in examining the question of illegal encouragement, took "too myopic" a
view of the problem.
The Second Circuit's rejection of the result in Miranda Fuel did not
constitute a rejection of the Board's doctrine therein enunciated for the
first time. The Board persisted in its Miranda Fuael approach in later
cases, and in United Rubber Workers v. NLRB3 2 the Fifth Circuit granted
enforcement. Factually, the case was an easy one. The local represented
Goodyear employees in the company's Alabama plant which operated
31. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962).
32. Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1967
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along racially segregated lines. The contract was silent on the point.
Various Negro employees were laid off while white employees with less
seniority were kept on. The laid-off employees requested that the union
process a grievance concerning the company's actions. The local refused
and continued to refuse even after the international president indicated
that he thought the grievance should be processed. The court stated:
[W]e must determine whether a breach of the duty of fair representation in itself constitutes an unfair labor practice within
contemplation of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
We are convinced that the duty of fair representation implicit in
the exclusive-representative requirement in section 9(a) of the
act comprises an indispensable element of the right of employees
"to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing" as guaranteed in section 7. We therefore conclude that
by summarily refusing to process the complainants' grievances
concerning back wages and segregated plant facilities, petitioner
thereby violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the act by restraining
33
those employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.
The court went on to express its disagreement with Judge Medina's
opinion in Miranda Fuel:
To adopt a narrow interpretation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) which
would only protect the comprehensive section 7 right of employees
to bargain collectively in those cases involving union conduct
which encourages or discourages union membership would to a
large degree render such right meaningless in the area of union
administration of the bargaining agreement. Indeed, it is only
through the day-to-day administration of individual grievances
that employee rights achieved in the negotiated bargaining contract are placed in a definitive context, and through which specific
individual claims find a vital means of protection 3 4

III. DEVELOPMENT

OF AcTIONs AVAILABLE TO THE INDIVIDUAL

In Rubber Workers, the Board's Miranda Fuel policy was approved.
A breach of the duty of fair representation could be an unfair labor
practice. Does this mean, therefore, that there could never be a suit for
breach of the duty of fair representation, the court's jurisdiction always
being pre-empted by the Board? The answer lies in an analysis of a
section 301 suit and the determination of the nature of the duty of fair
representation.
33. Id. at 17.
34. Id. at 20-21.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol32/iss2/4
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On its face section 301 seems merely procedural. In the days following its enactment the various federal courts divided as to the scope of
the provision. Some held it to be merely jurisdictional, providing a forum
wherein unions could sue or be sued for breach of the collective agreement
under state law.3 5 Others held that the provision was intended to authorize
the creation of a body of federal substantive law in the field of labor
management relations.3 6
37
The Supreme Court's decision in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills
ended the dispute. This was a suit to compel arbitration. The Court examined the legislative history and concluded not only that the district
court had jurisdiction to entertain the action and grant relief but also that
the law to be applied was federal law. The Court stated:
The question then is, what is the substantive law to be
applied in suits under §301(a)? We conclude that the substantive
law to apply in suits under §301(a) is federal law, which the
courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.
. . . The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes
some substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may
not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in the penumbra
of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory
sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy.
The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the
nature of the problem.38
The decision in Lincoln Mills resolved the problem raised by Justice
Frankfurter in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 9 In that case, the majority of the Court, although
writing in separate opinions, concluded that section 301 was merely procedural and gave no cause of action to a union to recover wages for
35. International Longshoremen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S.
237 (1952); Mercury Oil Ref. Co. v. Oil Workers, 187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951);
Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers, 167 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948);
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 115 F. Supp. 231
(E.D.N.Y. 1953); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United Office Workers, 93
F. Supp. 296 (D.N.J. 1950).
36. Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 182
F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950) (dictum); Waialua Agr. Co. v. United Sugar Workers,
114 F. Supp. 243 (D. Hawaii 1953); Textile Workers v. American Thread Co.,
113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953); Textile Workers v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp.
626 (M.D.N.C. 1950); Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 83 F. Supp.
162 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
37. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
38. Id. at 456-57.
39. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1967
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employees who had lost a day's wages due to an unauthorized walkout.
In a lengthy analysis of the statute Frankfurter determined that, in the
absence of a clear congressional mandate, there were no substantive rights
created by section 301 running in favor of the enforcement of individual
rights and that, therefore, the Congress could not confer jurisdiction upon
the federal courts in the absence of diversity. To do so, said Frankfurter,
would raise a grave constitutional problem which he avoided by coming
down in favor of a procedural analysis.
Lincoh? Mills was taken to end the procedural-substantive dispute
concerning section 301. Smith v. Evening News Ass', 40 ended the question
as to the status of the individual to sue under section 301. In that case
the employee, a union member, was denied the right to work during a
strike of another union against the employer while non-union employees
were permitted to go to work. Suit was brought in state court and the
court dismissed for want of jurisdiction on the ground that the allegations, if true, would make out an unfair labor practice under the National
Labor Relations Act and the court's jurisdiction was therefore pre-empted.
The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed and, on certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court reversed. The Court first reiterated its holding that
even though the facts underlying a section 301 suit also arguably constituted an unfair labor practice, the jurisdiction of the court would not be
pre-empted.
The Court then dealt with the question of the individual's rights
under section 301, rejecting the rest of the Westinghouse rule by stating:
The concept that all suits to vindicate individual employee
rights arising from a collective bargaining contract should be excluded from the coverage of §301 has thus not survived. The
rights of individual employees concerning rates of pay and conditions of employment are a major focus of the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining contracts. Individual claims
lie at the heart of the grievance and arbitration machinery, are
to a large degree inevitably intertwined with union interests and
many times precipitate grave questions concerning the interpretation and enforceability of the collective bargaining contract on
which they are based. To exclude these claims from the ambit of
§301 would stultify the congressional policy of having the administration of collective bargaining contracts accomplished under
a uniform body of federal substantive law. This we are unwilling
to do.41
40. 371 U.S. 195 (1962), reversing 362 Mich. 350, 106 N.W.2d 785 (1961).
41. Id. at 200.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol32/iss2/4
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Smrith was followed, in time, by Humphrey v. Moore.4 2 That case
involved a complicated fact situation, the gist of which was that the
same union represented two separate bargaining units whose members
were employed by two new car transportation companies. One of the
companies absorbed the other because of a reduction in business. The
absorption was to result in the discharge of a number of employees, and
the crucial question was whether the seniority lists were to be sandwiched or "dovetailed" or whether the employees of the absorbing company were to be kept on without regard to the comparative seniority
of the two groups of employees. There was a contract provision on the
point. At first the union indicated to plaintiff's group that, even though
generally junior to the other group, there was no question but that they
would keep their jobs. As the facts became clearer, the union reversed
itself. The senior employees of the company absorbed filed a grievance
concerning proper administration of the contract. The grievance was submitted directly to the local joint committee and referred, as deadlocked,
to the Joint Conference Committee whose decision was final. That Committee held in favor of dovetailing.
The laid-off employees then sued in the Kentucky court to enjoin
the carrying out of the Committee decision. The complaint generally alleged that the union misrepresented the situation, deceived plaintiffs as
to their position, and conspired with the senior group to deprive plaintiffs of their jobs. The complaint also charged that the decision of
the Committee was arbitrary and violated the collective agreement. The
trial court denied relief but the state court of appeals reversed and granted
a permanent injunction.
On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed. Accepting the state court's
definition of the suit as one to enforce a collective bargaining agreement,
the Court determined, first, that there was an absorption here within
the meaning of the contract provision and that the Committee had authority to give meaning to the provision in relation to this problem and,
second, that plaintiffs had not proven that the union had breached its
duty of fair representation. The Court noted that the settlement of disputes so that one group of employees is favored over another is not, of
itself, a violation of the duty.
Goldberg and Brennan concurred in the result. They argued, however, that this was not an action under section 301 but merely an individual's suit for breach of the duty of fair representation. The majority
42. 375 U.S. 335 (1964), reversing 356 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1962).
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had accepted, without independent examination, the state court's categorization of the suit. Actually, the essence of the complaint was that the
Joint Conference Committee had exceeded its authority in making the
decision it did. The breach of contract was to occur when Moore was
discharged in accordance with the decision, an event which had not yet
happened. There was no question but that the Joint Conference Committee had the authority, under the collective agreement, to resolve the
problem. And the teachings of the Steelworkers' cases43 are to the effect
that the question raised concerning the meaning of the agreement is
not for the courts. Goldberg pointed out that the parties to the agreement
were free to bargain for solutions to problems, which in essence was
what had occurred through the use of the grievance procedure in this
case. He went on to say that the employee was protected in this situation
by the right to sue for breach of the duty of fair representation, which
duty was implied from the statutes rather than derived from the agreement. Moore had simply not made a case.
The decision in Hinplrey v. Moore, by dealing with the breach
of the duty of fair representation as a section 301 suit, i.e., growing out
of a breach of contract, provided an answer to the Miranda Fuel preemption question because Smitk v. Evening News holds that a suit
for breach of contract brought under section 301 is not pre-empted even
though the operative facts "arguably" constitute an unfair labor practice. As has been suggested above, however, the majority's analysis is
Hwurnplrey v. Moore was not sound. As Justice Goldberg pointed out,
their analysis, to some degree, ran contrary to the realities of the collective bargaining environment. Valid resolution of the pre-emption problem
posed by Miranda Fuel was yet to come.
After Hvwipkrey v. Moore the Supreme Court decided one other case
which had an impact on the individual's right to bring a suit under section 301. In Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox"4 the laid off employee sued
for severance pay in the state court. Judgment for the employee was
affirmed by the highest state court. The Supreme Court reversed, saying
that "unless the contract provides otherwise, there can be no doubt that
the employee must afford the union the opportunity to act on his behalf."'4 5
Thus, ignoring the grievance procedure was fatal to plaintiff's cause. The
43. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
44. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
45. Id. at 653.
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Court further stated that union participation in the settlement of the
grievance was vital, both to the development of a uniform application
of the collective agreement and because, in most if not all of these cases,
the issues went beyond the interests of the one employee involved and
affected all of the employees. Resort to the court was left open if the
grievance procedure was not the exclusive remedy.

IV. THE

STATUS OF THE INDIVIDuAL'S REMEDIES

What, then, were the remedies available to the individual in the fact
situation originally considered? Although not all these cases had been
decided when Owens' union refused to process his grievance against
Swift any further, the outlines of the two available theories were clear.
He could sue the company for breach of the collective agreement based
on unlawful discharge; he could sue the union for breach of its duty of
fair representation. The first suit, according to Maddox, could only be
brought after the grievance procedure was exhausted while the second
would be based on the fact that the grievance procedure was not exhausted.
Owens chose to sue the union in state court for breach of its duty
of fair representation.4 6 A jury found for plaintiff in the sum of $10,300.
The trial court set aside the verdict and entered judgment for the union
on grounds of pre-emption. The Missouri Supreme Court reinstated the
jury's verdict, and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. During the course of the appeal Owens died and his administrator
was substituted as a party. The United States Supreme Court held that
state courts have jurisdiction in this type of case but that the state court
here had not applied the governing federal law and that therefore the judgment must be reversed. It was not enough, said the Court, that the jury
found that the grievance had merit. The jury must also find that
the union's handling of the grievance and their refusal to process it was
not in good faith and was arbitrary and capricious. Since there was no
such finding, the judgment could not stand.
Addressing itself to the pre-emption problem posed by Miranda Fuel,
the Court held that the doctrine of the duty of fair representation was
one developed by the courts and that there was no compelling reason
why the Board should have exclusive jurisdiction. In so holding it stated:
This pre-emption doctrine, however, has never been rigidly
applied to cases where it could not fairly be inferred that Con46. The first reported opinion in this case appears in Sipes v. Vaca, 397
S.W.2d 658 (Mo. En Banc 1965).
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gress intended exclusive jurisdiction to lie with the NLRB. Congress itself has carved out exceptions to the Board's exclusive jurisdiction ...
In addition to these congressional exceptions, this Court has
refused to hold state remedies pre-empted "where the activity
regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act . . . [or] touched interests so deeply rooted

in local feeling and responsibility that in the absence of compelling
congressional directions, we could not infer that Congress has deprived the States of the power to act."...
A primary justification for the pre-emption doctrine-the
need to avoid conflicting rules of substantive law in the labor relations area and the desirability of leaving the development of
such rules to the administrative agency created by Congress for
that purpose-is not applicable to cases involving alleged breaches
of the union duty of fair representation. The doctrine was judicially
developed . . . and suits alleging breach of the duty remained

judicially cognizable long after the NLRB was given unfair labor
practice jurisdiction . . . . Moreover when the Board declared
[its rule] in MirandaFwl ... [it] adopted and applied the doc-

trine as it had been developed by the federal courts.47

The Court also noted that the Board was no more expert than the
courts in this area, because of the substantive nature of the analysis
required to reach decisions. Further, certain characteristics of unfair labor
practice procedures, such as the General Counsel's unreviewable discretion to refuse to issue a complaint, were alien to the purportedly soothing effects of a suit for breach of the duty. While the Court generally
discredited the usefulness of the remedy established by Miranda Fuel, i.e.,
that the breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor
practice which may be processed by the Board, it is interesting to note
that the Court did not reject the Miranda Fuel approach.
Following the Vaca case, what can be said concerning the rights of
individuals under the National Labor Relations Act? The Court speculated at some length as to various courses of action, in an attempt to
illustrate the point that some remedy at law remained for the individual
employee. The Court recognized the hard problem presented by the
fact that in the union-employee relationship the employee has surrendered
many of his rights to the union. Nonetheless, the Court was of the opinion
that some avenues of litigation should be left open. As will be seen, however,
their efficacy is severely limited.
47. Vaca v. Sipes, 87 Sup. Ct. 903, 911-12 (1967).
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In a situation where the collective agreement contains a grievance
procedure concluding with arbitration, the employee must exhaust the
remedies contained in the agreement before resorting to a suit for breach
of contract under section 301.48 A failure to exhaust is a defense to such a
suit. Since arbitration is generally considered final and binding, the employee dissatisfied with an award might not be able to obtain judicial
consideration of the merits of his case. His suit would be confined to
challenging the award as arbitrary or beyond the scope of the submission,
elements difficult to prove. Only in a situation where the collective agreement does not contain a grievance procedure will the section 301 suit
be of particular value to an employee, and this is itself a rare thing.
Thus, as a practical matter, there will hardly ever be a section 301 suit
brought by an employee that will involve a decision on the merits.
Instead, judicial review will look to the procedural fairness, the existence
of evidence supporting the arbitrator's decision, and an absence of arbitrary and discriminatory conduct.
Where the grievance procedure exists, and is not exhausted, the
employee may sue for breach of the duty of fair representation and for
breach of contract. Again, failure to exhaust, as in the Vaca case, would
be a defense to the suit for breach of contract unless the employee can
show a breach of the union's duty. But the Court would require proof
that the failure to exhaust resulted from the union's wrongful conduct
before it would reach the merits of the suit. It does not seem that the
employee need also prove that he was correct in his grievance, but this
may well be the only way he could illustrate the union's wrongful conduct
in the absence of blatant acts. And, while the Court suggests that where
the grievance procedure has not been exhausted and an action is brought
the breach of contract suit depends on the outcome of the suit for breach
of the duty, it does not seem necessary to sue both the union and the
employer in the same action. The theories and the proofs applicable to
the two suits are different. But the joinder may be made as a matter of
convenience and there would be some elements of damages which are inter49
dependent.
48. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, supra note 44.
49. The Board's place in this scheme is not clear from the opinion in Vaca.
The majority seemed to favor judicial resolutions because of the court's ability to
award suitable remedies. Yet the Board can grant back pay and assess the cost
against both employer and union. See the first Miranda decision at 125 N.L.R.B.
454 (1959). The difficulties of bringing suit may make the Board's remedies more
attractive, even though the amount of damages will be limited. The employee will
be limited to back pay, whereas the court could grant punitive damages in addiPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1967
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The Court in the Vaca case devoted part of its opinion to considerations of the damages, pointing out that damages must be apportioned
between the employer and the union according to fault. Most if not all of
the damages will flow directly from the employer's alleged breach of the
contract. The union's refusal to proceed could cause some injury, but the
precise amount would be difficult to show.
Of course, there is some rationale for these rather severe limitations
on the employee's rights, independent of his union, to sue. The act is
intended to achieve industrial peace which in turn contemplates the participation of responsible parties. A union cannot be very responsible if
its decision not to prosecute a grievance to arbitration can be overturned
at the whim of the grievant who often has no perspective of the problem.
Yet who will protect the employee against the failings of a well-meaning
but somewhat incapable union? Or, against a union-management coalition?5 0
The decision in Vaca can only have the result of projecting the courts
more and more into examining the substance of grievance proceedings and
drawing even finer lines as to what constitutes arbitrary and capricious
and discriminatory conduct on the part of unions and arbitrators. Otherwise, the availability of remedies outside the collective agreement will
have little practical meaning to the individual.

tion. The employee will have the advantage of trying his case in a forum well
acquainted with the labor field.
There are some interesting problems. If an employee files a charge and wins,
is this conclusive in the arbitration or litigation which follows? Or, if he loses before the Board, what result in the courts? If the employee chooses to sue, is there
a problem of primary jurisdiction because of the expertise of the Board?
50. See, for example Black's dissent to a denial of certiorari in Simmons v.
Union News Co., 382 U.S. 884 (1965).
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